Who comes out ahead after all of this? Who benefits in the long run? I’m having a hard time finding any winners.
Nobody ever really wins here. In either the short term, or the long term, with or without violence. If the clap back of oct 7th hadn’t happened, then the state of affairs would’ve remained exactly as horrible as they’ve always been, and probably would’ve slowly decomposed even further, and the population probably would’ve just died slower deaths over the course of several years. Certainly in retrospect, that maybe seems better than the alternative, but nobody knows the future, really. It could be just as likely the oct 7th was exactly the kind of pressure that started a chain of events that ultimately leads to the deconstruction of the state of israel. It’s completely impossible to know the future, completely, anything else is kind of just armchair speculation.
We have to place oct 7th into context, and to place it into context, we have to have a chain of causality. That eliminates the sort of responsibility that people like to attribute to everything. It doesn’t eliminate tactics, or the decision making process, it actually enhances it, if anything, but we do have to look at, say, how the state of affairs in gaza lead to such an attack. Both in how such a sorry state led to such an attack, obviously, and also in how Hamas was funded as their government in part by israel in order to ensure a more violent opposing force that would be more willing to mutually escalate with them, especially when that force is locked in to a specific location and can only really fight on israel’s terms, unlike most of israel’s other actors, which can fight more on the terms of the international political stage. Obviously still a deck which is heavily stacked against them, but slightly less so.
What I mean by all of this is that israel manufactured the conditions to enact their genocide, and that escalation would’ve happened either way because they’re not able to be bargained with. Under that framework, any tactic the gazans, specifically, could’ve taken, was pretty much doomed to failure from the start. Or rather, was doomed to not really have a positive outcome in the immediate short term, for them specifically. I’m not saying oct 7th was really a wise decision, right, I’m just saying that we don’t really know. Maybe attribute to me analysis paralysis, then, I’m not quite sure, ironically, but I think it’s easier to have a hindsight-accurate armchair QB backseat approach to this than to make those decisions of what to do in the moment.
What I mean by all of this is that israel manufactured the conditions to enact their genocide, and that escalation would’ve happened either way because they’re not able to be bargained with.
They’re clearly open to being bargained with, as that’s exactly what the incoming Trump admin did to extend hostilities in Gaza through the beginning of his new term. But they can’t be negotiated with in Gaza because Gaza residents have no cards to play.
I think it’s easier to have a hindsight-accurate armchair QB backseat approach to this than to make those decisions of what to do in the moment.
I agree. And I’m not citing Oct 7th as some kind of policy blunder on the part of Palestine’s political leadership nearly so much as I’m using it as an example of the vaunted guerrilla insurgency tactics falling completely flat. The idea that you can outfight an adversary with every economic, organizational, and technological advantage seems embedded in American consciousness. Vietnam and Afghanistan are these David v Goliath stories of the little guy beating the military behemoth. But they neglect the decades of blood and tears shed along the way. What you have in these territories aren’t “winners” so much as “survivors”.
Fighting back is expensive and extremely risky. Its a move of last-resort, not a determent strategy or a power play.
Nobody ever really wins here. In either the short term, or the long term, with or without violence. If the clap back of oct 7th hadn’t happened, then the state of affairs would’ve remained exactly as horrible as they’ve always been, and probably would’ve slowly decomposed even further, and the population probably would’ve just died slower deaths over the course of several years. Certainly in retrospect, that maybe seems better than the alternative, but nobody knows the future, really. It could be just as likely the oct 7th was exactly the kind of pressure that started a chain of events that ultimately leads to the deconstruction of the state of israel. It’s completely impossible to know the future, completely, anything else is kind of just armchair speculation.
We have to place oct 7th into context, and to place it into context, we have to have a chain of causality. That eliminates the sort of responsibility that people like to attribute to everything. It doesn’t eliminate tactics, or the decision making process, it actually enhances it, if anything, but we do have to look at, say, how the state of affairs in gaza lead to such an attack. Both in how such a sorry state led to such an attack, obviously, and also in how Hamas was funded as their government in part by israel in order to ensure a more violent opposing force that would be more willing to mutually escalate with them, especially when that force is locked in to a specific location and can only really fight on israel’s terms, unlike most of israel’s other actors, which can fight more on the terms of the international political stage. Obviously still a deck which is heavily stacked against them, but slightly less so.
What I mean by all of this is that israel manufactured the conditions to enact their genocide, and that escalation would’ve happened either way because they’re not able to be bargained with. Under that framework, any tactic the gazans, specifically, could’ve taken, was pretty much doomed to failure from the start. Or rather, was doomed to not really have a positive outcome in the immediate short term, for them specifically. I’m not saying oct 7th was really a wise decision, right, I’m just saying that we don’t really know. Maybe attribute to me analysis paralysis, then, I’m not quite sure, ironically, but I think it’s easier to have a hindsight-accurate armchair QB backseat approach to this than to make those decisions of what to do in the moment.
They’re clearly open to being bargained with, as that’s exactly what the incoming Trump admin did to extend hostilities in Gaza through the beginning of his new term. But they can’t be negotiated with in Gaza because Gaza residents have no cards to play.
I agree. And I’m not citing Oct 7th as some kind of policy blunder on the part of Palestine’s political leadership nearly so much as I’m using it as an example of the vaunted guerrilla insurgency tactics falling completely flat. The idea that you can outfight an adversary with every economic, organizational, and technological advantage seems embedded in American consciousness. Vietnam and Afghanistan are these David v Goliath stories of the little guy beating the military behemoth. But they neglect the decades of blood and tears shed along the way. What you have in these territories aren’t “winners” so much as “survivors”.
Fighting back is expensive and extremely risky. Its a move of last-resort, not a determent strategy or a power play.