QUIC is already ~30% of HTTP traffic. That’s enough to not make UDP use stick out as suspicious.
The IP storage also doesn’t have anything to do with Tor guard nodes - in a VPN-before-Tor scenario, the guard nodes would only see the VPN server’s address, whereas in a Tor-before-VPN scenario, the VPN server would only see the exit node instead, which remains unchanged throughout the time a connection is established. If establishing a new connection instead, you have to negotiate keys for that new connection, with the previous connection’s keys not being used. The VPN server would only see connection data for the 2 exit nodes.
I watched it and continue being retarded, apparently.
The concerns of “using UDP instead of TCP” and “Connections need to be kept in memory until they time out” look like nothingburgers to a layperson, which isn’t helped by technical inaccuracies such as the conflation of multithreading with multiprocessing.
https://hiphish.github.io/blog/2023/10/18/grayjay-is-not-open-source/